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HOW DOES FISCAL POLICY AFFECT THE
AMERICAN WORKER?
JOHN D. MUELLER*
OVERVIEW
American policymakers have begun to prepare the public
for fiscal policy changes, such as comprehensive reforms of the
Federal income tax and Social Security retirement systems, which
would profoundly alter the lives of American workers and their
families. Projected fiscal imbalances are clearly unsustainable,
and Europe's economic and demographic crisis, characterized by
high unemployment and falling fertility rates, illustrates the
grave dangers of policy mistakes. But no American consensus
has emerged, partly because there is no generally accepted and
empirically grounded theory explaining how fiscal policy affects
employment and fertility. This paper lays out a simple but com-
prehensive framework for analyzing such questions, by proceed-
ing from the homey example of a children's lemonade stand to
describe how Augustine's theory of personal love and Aristotle's
theory of distributive justice were originally integrated within
economic analysis. The second section applies the analysis to
describe and update "Rueffs Law," which explains how employ-
ment and unemployment are determined by the cost of labor
(measured as workers' share of total labor and property income
after government taxes and benefits). The analysis shows that
funding social benefits either by borrowing or with income taxes
raises the cost of labor and unemployment, while funding such
benefits with payroll taxes does not increase unemployment but
may lower labor market participation. The third section extends
the analysis to fill a crucial gap in the economic theory of fertility
and shows that most variation in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
among the fifty countries for which data are available (compris-
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ing about two-thirds of the world population) is explained by just
three factors: Fertility is about equally inversely related to per
capita social benefits and per capita national savings, but
strongly, positively related to frequency of worship (an indicator
of people's preference for persons other than themselves).
Thus, either allowing social benefits to rise as a share of national
income (as Democrats propose) or forcing workers to save more
by shifting the tax burden to labor income (as Republicans pro-
pose) would tip fertility below the replacement rate of about 2.1
children per couple. Combining these analyses leads to an
important conclusion: To avoid both a fall in fertility below the
replacement rate and a rise in the unemployment rate as in
Europe, social benefits must not be permitted to grow as a share
of national income and must continue to be financed by taxes on
labor income, while government services benefiting both workers
and property owners must be funded by an income tax that falls
equally on labor and property income.
I. INTRODUCTION
American policymakers have begun preparing the public for
fiscal policy changes, such as comprehensive reforms of the Fed-
eral income tax, Social Security, and Medicare systems that would
profoundly affect the lives of American workers and their fami-
lies. It is generally agreed that projected fiscal imbalances are
unsustainable. Moreover, a chorus of analysts across the political
spectrum (including Phillip Longman, Robert Samuelson,
Nicholas Eberstadt, George Weigel, and Allan Carlson) has
warned that the United States is on the brink of exactly the same
demographic black hole that already has started to swallow
Europe and Japan, characterized by falling fertility, chronic
unemployment, and overstrained budgets. No American policy
consensus has emerged, partly because of political faction
(which, as James Madison noted, is endemic to representative
government), but partly also because there is no generally
accepted and empirically verified economic theory explaining
how fiscal policy affects employment and fertility. In this paper, I
attempt to lay out a simple but comprehensive framework for
analyzing such questions by updating the theories of two impor-
tant but neglected economic thinkers: St. Augustine and 20th
century French economist Jacques Rueff.
Our Symposium on The American Worker is necessarily an inter-
disciplinary effort, bringing together experts in law, moral philos-
ophy, and economics, to name only a few. But how can these
apparently disparate perspectives achieve the common good of
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our mutual understanding of the subject without, on the one
hand, succumbing to the mutual incomprehensibility of scien-
tific and literary cultures famously alleged by C.P. Snow' or, on
the other hand, requiring all other disciplines to submit to colo-
nization by what George J. Stigler styled the "imperial science"2
of economics?
Both problems can be avoided if we begin by acknowledging
that economics differs fundamentally from natural sciences by
treating a certain aspect of human behavior, as Lionel Robbins'
famous but widely misquoted definition3 made clear. We are not
dealing with a distant galaxy or an exotic breed of mollusk whose
existence and nature can be learned only by or from specialists:
we are dealing with the human race, "to which so many of my
readers belong," as G.K. Chesterton dryly put it.4
It is true that economics is today a mathematical discipline.
That is because moral philosophy always has been a mathemati-
cal discipline, and economics always has been a branch of moral
philosophy, not vice versa. As we will see, Aristotle formulated
the theories of production, distributive justice, and justice in
exchange (which economists now call "equilibrium") as mathe-
matical functions, just as Augustine formulated the theories of
human love, utility, beneficence, and the meaning of the Two
Great Commandments as expressing our mathematical scales of
preference (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and so on) for persons as ends and
other things as means.5 And Thomas Aquinas followed their
examples when he integrated these elements into a single coher-
ent framework. But Alfred Marshall once gave another econo-
mist this excellent advice: "(1) Use mathematics as a shorthand
language, rather than an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till
1. See C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES (1993) (including original Rede
lecture that Snow delivered in 1959).
2. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 191
(1988).
3. "Economics is the science which studies human behaviour [sic] as a
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Lio-
NEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 16
(2d ed., rev. 1935).
4. VI G.K. CHESTERTON, THE NAPOLEON OF NOTTING HILL, in COLLECTED
WORKS 220 (Ignatius, 1991) (1904).
5. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Sir David Ross ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1958) (c.325-350 B.C.) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair ed., Penguin Books 1962)
(c.325 B.C.); SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD (John O'Meara ed., Penguin Clas-
sics 1984) (413-427); SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (Christian
Classics Ethereal Library [public domain] n.d.), available at http://www.ccel.
org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.html (397-427) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE, ON
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE].
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[sic] you have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illus-
trate by examples that are important in real life. (5) Burn the
mathematics. "6 In other words, mathematics cannot go beyond
what can be said in English. But as we will see, it does serve some
very useful purposes: checking whether a theory is logically com-
plete, discovering its implicit assumptions, and quantifying and
testing its predictions. I propose to follow Marshall's advice and
explore the principles, by which fiscal policy affects the employ-
ment and fertility of American workers, by beginning with a sim-
ple example, which I hope will help us realize (like Moliere's
character who was equally astonished and proud to learn that he
had been speaking prose all his life) that all of us have been prac-
ticing economics without knowing it. I plan not to burn, but to
bury the mathematics (in footnotes) for the sake of those who
find prose too prosaic.
I will start with the homey example of a children's lemonade
stand to describe the elements of economic analysis and apply
them to describe its four aspects: production, consumption, gifts,
and exchange.
Next, I will apply the same analysis to explain Rueff's Law,
which explains unemployment as a function of the cost of labor
(which turns out to be the same as workers' share of total labor
and property income, after subtracting taxes and adding govern-
ment benefits to persons). We will find that, since social benefits
accrue to owners of "human capital," while an income tax falls on
owners of both "human" and "nonhuman capital," social benefits
funded by taxes on property income raise the cost of labor and
unemployment, while benefits funded with payroll taxes lower
labor market employment and take-home pay, but without rais-
ing the net cost of labor or the unemployment rate.
Then, I will extend the analysis to explain a crucial gap in
the economic theory of fertility, which is caused by neglecting
Augustine's insight that every person's most fundamental scale of
preferences is not for economic goods (that is, utility), but for
the persons who are the ends or purposes of the activity (that is,
love at the personal level and distributive justice at all social and
political levels). We distribute our personal or political resources
to other persons in proportion to the significance of those per-
sons to ourselves, and since the same scarce resources cannot be
consumed by oneself as well as others, the share of resources
devoted to oneself is inversely related to the share devoted to
others. This will explain why most variation in the Total Fertility
Rate among the fifty countries for which data are available (com-
6. MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL 427 (A.C. Pigou ed., 1956).
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prising about two-thirds of the world population) is explained by
just three factors: the TFR is inversely related to per capita social
benefits and per capita national saving (resources devoted to
self), but it is positively related to frequency of worship (an indi-
cator of resources allocated to other persons).
The analysis leads to two important conclusions. First, if
social benefits increase as a share of national income, as is pro-
jected under current policy, and are funded either by borrowing
or by the income tax, the unemployment rate will rise as it has in
Europe, and as a result, the actual U.S. national income will fall
further below its potential amount at full employment. Second,
either allowing social benefits to mushroom as a share of the
economy (as Democrats propose) or forcing workers to save
more by shifting the tax burden from income to payroll taxes (as
Republicans propose) would tip fertility below the current
replacement rate, of about 2.1 children per couple, to as low as
1.6 by 2075. Therefore, to avoid an increase in unemployment
and a fall in population, social benefits must not increase signifi-
cantly as a share of national income and must be financed by
taxes on labor income, while general government is funded by an
income tax that falls equally on labor and property income.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Economics of a Lemonade Stand
The elements of economic theory necessary to explain the
effects of fiscal policy on employment and fertility can be under-
stood by anyone familiar with the working of a children's lemon-
ade stand. The prerequisites of such an enterprise are a product
(lemonade), a supply of potential customers (say, the people
entering or leaving a hiking trail or bike path on a warm day),
and a purpose (say, using half as spending money and donating
half for disaster relief). To produce lemonade, as with almost
any other product, it is necessary to combine the services of some
person(s) (so-called "human capital") with those of productive
property ("nonhuman capital"). To keep track, we will suppose
that a brother and sister are involved: One supplies the labor
(mixing the ingredients, setting up the stand, making a sign,
waiting on or soliciting customers), while the other supplies the
property (say, a folding table, a pitcher, a cooler, a mixing spoon,
glasses, poster board, and marker or crayons for a sign) and the
raw ingredients (lemonade mix, water, and ice).'
7. We might also recognize a third function, enterprise: whose idea was
the lemonade stand; who chose the time and location, etc.? I will ignore this
2006]
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Beyond these prerequisites, the business is largely a matter
of price. Because customers ordinarily value the first glass of
lemonade more highly than the fifth, the demand for lemonade
varies inversely to its price. If the price were set too low (say, a
penny a glass), the supply of lemonade would be quickly
exhausted: Customers would have to be turned away; yet the
stand would fail to cover its cost of raw materials, much less pro-
vide any income for the children. Economists call this "excess
demand." If the asking price were too high (say, one hundred
dollars a glass), there would be no customers and, again, no
income: a case of "excess supply." Somewhere in between is the
price that equalizes supply and demand, maximizing income for
the sellers and conforming most closely to the preferences of the
customers. Ordinarily, this optimum price cannot be predicted
in advance but requires a certain amount of trial and error.
Anyone who has observed the process in real life realizes
that it is necessary to take into account the demand for lemon-
ade, not only from potential customers, but also from the
"worker" and "proprietor" of the stand. In calculating quantities
to produce and the selling price, the sellers will want to allow for
the possibility of drinking some of the lemonade themselves,
especially if it promises to be a long, warm day. (They may be
idealistic but, also, thirsty.) If demand is slack and the price
received from customers is below a certain point, the sellers may
prefer to drink the stuff themselves; on the other hand, if
demand is brisk and the price higher, they may curb their own
consumption in order to increase the stand's cash sales and their
own compensation.
Now, how should the revenues from the sale of lemonade be
divided? It might seem that a fifty-fifty split makes the most
sense, and if the children contributed equally to starting the
enterprise, this is a reasonable way to split any profits (what is left
over from sales after paying costs). But this does not help in fig-
uring out the compensation of the worker and proprietor
because their services comprise most of the costs. A little experi-
ence reveals that what is fair compensation varies and depends
ultimately on how sales revenue responds to changes in the rela-
tive contributions of the worker and proprietor. For example,
suppose that, on two successive days, all of the conditions but
one were the same-same number of passersby, same weather,
same quantity of lemonade produced and offered for sale-
complication and treat profits as if they were a part of property compensation
since our purpose is basically to understand the relation between a product's
price and the compensation of its producers.
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except that, on the first day, the lemonade stand's "worker" puts
in four hours, but on the second day, five hours, producing lem-
onade and waiting on customers. It is obvious, in this case, that
the additional revenue must be due to the additional effort by
the worker. Alternatively, suppose that the number of hours
worked and all the other factors are the same on both days,
except that, on the first day, there is no cooler to keep the lem-
onade from becoming lukewarm while, on the second day, the
"proprietor" brings a cooler, thus allowing the advertised "Ice
Cold Lemonade" to be sold ice cold rather than lukewarm. In
this case, the increase in sales on the second day, compared with
the first, obviously is attributable to the provision of the cooler.
In principle, the whole proceeds from the sale of lemonade
can be divided in this way between the child who provides only
labor and the child who provides only the use of property. The
children will notice that,just as the value of an additional glass of
lemonade to a customer varies inversely with the quantity the cus-
tomer has already consumed, the value of the worker's and pro-
prietor's incremental services varies inversely with the amount
already provided. For example, the amount of extra sales real-
ized when the worker works one hour is obviously larger than
when he works none, and that, in turn, is larger than the extra
sales realized when the worker works for two hours instead of
one, than working three hours instead of two, and so on. Simi-
larly, the increase in sales will normally be larger after the first
dozen ice cubes are added to the pitcher than after the second
dozen. So, if the children accurately perceive what is happening,
they should be able to divide the income with a reasonable
degree of objectivity, in proportion to the share of the proceeds
traceable to the contributions of each. It is often difficult in the
real world to disentangle all the variables, especially for an iso-
lated business. But it is much easier to see under conditions of
competition-for example, with one or more competing lemon-
ade stands in the vicinity-because the change of a single feature
by one business firm results in its capturing a larger share of the
market, thus forcing the other competing firms either to offer
the same feature or else lose customers and ultimately go out of
business.
B. From Producing Lemonade to Producing its Producers
In describing the lemonade stand, we have sketched out the
general description of a business firm that produces one kind of
good (in this case, lemonade) with two kinds of factors or pro-
ducers (people and property). And in explaining the effect of
2006]
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fiscal policy on employment at the national level, we will find that
the whole economy can fruitfully be viewed as if it were one large
stand producing a single composite product, GNP or GDP,
instead of lemonade. This is because the analysis of unemploy-
ment can take the absolute number of workers and the absolute
size of the "nonhuman capital" stock as given. (The unemploy-
ment rate measures the share of workers employed or unem-
ployed rather than their absolute numbers.) And we will learn
that the unemployment rate is closely linked to the net shares,
rather than the absolute amounts, of total income received by
workers and property owners. The simplification is further justi-
fied because, practically speaking, all unemployment occurs
within the labor market, not within households, and because
(with the partial exceptions of formal education and health care)
market production is confined almost entirely to nonhuman
goods.
So, if we left the analysis here, we would be able to explain
both how products and their producers' incomes originate and
what causes the producers to be employed or unemployed-but
not where the producers or their productive property come
from. But, without accounting for that, we would have nothing
to say about fertility or population and little to say about what
causes income and output to grow. In our example, where did
the "proprietor's" property-the table, pitcher, cooler, and so
forth-come from? These items must have been produced by a
process essentially similar to the children's production of lemon-
ade: by combining the services of people and property, possibly
produced within the children's family, but more probably, by a
business firm from which the family purchased them. Moreover,
in every lemonade stand in my experience, the productive prop-
erty has been borrowed from, without compensation to, the chil-
dren's parents: that is, it has been received as a gift. Both facts
apply also to the children themselves and are central to the dis-
cussion of fertility: First, the children were produced (or "repro-
duced") by their parents in a way analytically similar to the
children's production of lemonade or the business firm's pro-
duction of the cooler; and second, the endowments of human
and nonhuman goods with which the children began life were
received as gifts. As G.K. Chesterton put it, "the business done in
the home is nothing less than the shaping of the bodies and souls
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of humanity. The family is the factory that manufactures
mankind."8
Thus, to have a truly general theory embracing fertility as
well as employment, we must be able, when necessary, to regard
the two kinds of factors, human and nonhuman, as also being
two kinds of reproducible goods, human and nonhuman. The
analytical distinction between producer and product typically
depends not so much on their inherent qualities, as on how
humans treat them: Just as we can use a computer either to play
games or run a business, and drive a car for business or pleasure,
we can also use our own human faculties for work or recreation
(or for activities like worship, which is neither). And our descrip-
tion must be able to account not only for the ways in which an
individual person, a family, and a government resemble one
another, but also for how they differ.
To generalize our discussion, therefore, we might observe
that economics is essentially a theory of providence. Every economic
action raises, and its description by economic theory must
answer, three basic questions: First, for whom shall I provide? Sec-
ond, what shall I provide? And third, how shall I provide it? The
answer to the "how. ' question is simple when neither gift nor
exchange is involved because, in that case, everyone must pro-
duce all of what he or she uses from his or her own resources.
This would have been the case if our children had produced lem-
onade only to drink it themselves. But when exchange is
involved (as with selling lemonade to customers for money,
which can then be exchanged for an indefinite number of other
goods), the "how? ' question requires a two-part answer: (a) each
producer first produces something that he or she thinks some-
one else will value more highly than the good that that person
has produced; and (b) the two exchange their products for
mutual benefit. This leaves us with four elements to describe.
We can give a name to each and describe it as concisely as possi-
ble. I will put their mathematical descriptions in footnotes, so as
not to daunt the reader who is not mathematically inclined.
Since all four elements are simultaneously necessary for a com-
plete explanation, the order in which we consider them is some-
what arbitrary and may be rearranged as necessary for clarity of
exposition. What comes first in logical order may be last in the
succession of time, and vice versa. But in describing them I will
try as far as possible to treat them in logical order. The lemon-
8. ALVARO DE SILVA, G.K. CHESTERTON ON MEN & WOMEN, CHILDREN, SEX,
DIVORCE, MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 141 (1990) (citing G.K. Chesterton, The
Policeman as a Mother, THE NEW WITNESS, Nov. 14, 1919).
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ade stand, or any economic activity, can be fully described in four
brief sentences, or when amplified, four brief paragraphs, to
which correspond four mathematical equations':
1. For whom: "Final Distribution" (Personal Gifts and Crimes, and
Distributive Justice). We express the significance of the persons
who are the "ends" or purposes of our actions (including our-
selves) by distributing the use of our goods among them.' ° Each
person's actual consumption of goods (abstracting from differ-
ences in timing) equals the total wealth or income to be distrib-
uted, multiplied by that person's significance relative to all the
persons sharing in the distribution, and, so, is equal to that per-
son's factor income plus any net "transfer payments" received or
given. 11
2. What: "Utility" (Consumption). We value (or rank, or pre-
fer) scarce economic goods, like lemonade, as the means we
intend to be used by or for the persons who are the ultimate
9. Equations beginning with "1" denote the "two-factor, one-good"
model, and those beginning with "2" denote the "two-factor, two-good" model.
We will use the first for the discussion of employment and the second for the
discussion of fertility. All the actions described are understood to have the
dimension of time; for example, consumption, C, should be understood as C/
8t, or consumption per unit of time-the notation for which is usually omitted for
simplicity.
10. (1.1) CQ = YiDii/7Dij [final distribution function],
where CQi represents the use ("consumption") by Person i of the good Q Y is
total compensation of person i; Di is the significance of i to himself; YDij is the
significance to i of all persons.
(2.1) C =CL, = YiDi/YDij [final distribution function],
where CKi, and CL represent the use ("consumption") by i of the services of
"human capital," L, and "nonhuman capital," K; Y is total compensation of Per-
son i; D, is the significance of i to himself; YD is the significance to i of all
persons.
11. For clarity and simplicity, we will define:
(1.5) and (2.5) Yi - rK.+wLi,
meaning that Y is the total factor compensation of Person i; and
(1.6) and (2.6) T = (1 - Y,) Dii/YDij.
By substituting (1.6) and (2.6), (1.1) and (2.1) may be restated as:
(1.1a) CQ, = Y - Ti and
(2.1a) CK, + CL = Yi - Ti,
making clear that the difference between Person i's total consumption, CQj or
CKi, + CL,, and total compensation, Y, is equal to T,-(net) personal, domestic,
and political "transfer payments" from Person i to other persons.
By "net," I mean that personal gifts made are offset by gifts received, while
taxes are treated as political transfers paid and balanced against political trans-
fers received. Equations (1.1) and (2.1) are the simplest and most general
forms of the final distribution function for an individual person. The refine-
ments necessary to specifically describe gifts within marriage, from parents to
children and vice versa, as well as accounting for taxes and government bene-
fits, are considered below.
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purposes or "ends" of our activity. 12 Scarcity implies both that, as
the quantity of a good increases, the value of each additional unit
declines1" and also that part or all of the goods produced are
"used up"-that is, rendered unusable, by consumption.
3. How (a): "Production." We produce such scarce goods by
combining the useful services of people ("human capital") and
of property ("nonhuman capital"). 14
4. How (b): "Equilibrium" (Justice in Exchange). The sale of
each product provides the compensation of its producers: labor
compensation for the workers and property compensation for
the property owners.15 The income is thus wholly divided
between labor and property compensation. In a competitive
market, each factor is compensated in proportion to the share it
contributes to the total value of the final product.16
C. Parenthesis: A Brief, Remedial History of Economics
Anyone trained in modern economics will instantly recog-
nize the second, third, and fourth propositions, and their associ-
12. (1.2) U = f(CQ) [utility function],
where U ("utility") is the order of preference of person i for units of his or her
own consumption of the class of goods Q Co.
(2.2) Ui = f(CKi, CL) [utility function],
where Ui is the ranking by Person i ("utility") of units of CK, and CL the units
consumed in use by person i of the services of nonhuman goods, K, and
"human capital," L, respectively. In reality, CK, and CL are not two goods but
two classes of goods consumed: (K, K2 .. Kn) and (L1, L2 . Ln).
13. 8Ui/8C < 0.
14. (1.3) AQ = f(K,Li) [production function].
That is, Person i's production of Q is a function of his or her "nonhuman"
(K) and "human capital" (Li). As we will see, for the market economy as a
whole, the two factors are combined in roughly constant proportions: AYQ. =
XKaXLa, where a is the share of the total marginal product, YAQ,, contributed
by all "nonhuman capital," I, and 1-a is the share contributed by all "human
capital," XL.
(2. 3a) AK fl(K, L,) [production function for "nonhuman capital"];
(2.3b) ALi f2(K,, Li), [production function for "human capital"],
where AK is the change in the stock (production) of nonhuman goods, and
AL, is the change in the stock of "human capital," owned by person i.
15. (1.4) PQXAO = w1L + r1K [equilibrium condition], where PQ is the
price level (ideally corresponding to the GNP deflator), YAQa measure of total
output corresponding to real GNP, XL total hours worked in the labor market,
w labor compensation per unit of Li, and r the rate of return per unit of "non-
human capital" K wL is therefore total labor compensation, and ryK total
property compensation.
(2.4) PKAK+PLALi = rK+wLi [equilibrium condition], where PK and PL are the
unit prices of K and L, respectively, w is labor compensation per unit of L, r is
property compensation per unit of K. PL is a market price only in a slave-own-
ing society, like ancient Athens or the antebellum American South.
16. For example, 8YXQ/5Y&Li = wZLi/PJQ and 82Q/X. = rXKI/PQ1Q.
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ated mathematical descriptions, but not the first. Since the first
element describes the economic theory of personal love and dis-
tributive justice, its absence explains why modern economists
have such difficulty dealing with the large range of human activi-
ties that falls under both headings. A thorough historical
account is beyond the scope of this paper, 7 but a brief summary
will help us understand the unsatisfactory state of economic the-
ory regarding our topics of employment and fertility.
All four elements and their basic applications at the per-
sonal, domestic, and political levels were first integrated into a
coherent framework by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century.
The theory of utility, which explains consumption, originated
with St. Augustine; the theory of production using human and
nonhuman factors originated with Aristotle; the theory of equi-
librium originated with Aristotle (who called it 'justice in
exchange") ;18 the theory of final distribution was first adequately
stated, at the personal level, by Augustine and, at the social and
political levels, by Aristotle (who called it "distributive justice").19
This scholastic outline of economic theory was taught by
Catholics and, after the Reformation, notwithstanding their
other differences, Protestants alike from the 13th to the 18th
centuries.
Adam Smith started the new phase of "classical" economics
toward the end of the 18th century when he attempted to sim-
plify the outline of economics by omitting the first and second
elements: the theories of final distribution and utility.20 Smith
believed that the theory of utility could be dispensed with by
adopting what is loosely, but somewhat inaccurately, known as
the "labor theory of value. ' 21 Similarly, Smith dispensed with
Augustine's theory of personal distribution as early as his univer-
17. See, e.g., JOHN D. MUELLER, REDEEMING ECONOMICS: FREE MARKETS AND
THE HUMAN PERSON (2006) (including a more detailed account of the history of
economics, upon which this section relies).
18. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHFAN ETHICS, supra note 5, at 112-14.
19. See id. at 117-21.
20. This is despite having learned both theories from his teacher, Frances
Hutcheson, and having taught the theory of utility in his college lectures for
years after ridiculing it in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra
note 17.
21. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 56-66 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1966) (1776); see also MUEL-
LER, supra note 17. More accurately, what Smith did was to substitute a "one-
factor" theory of production for the scholastic version, which always contained
at least two factors. Smith's economic theory, in his university lectures, was
peculiar in containing only one factor of production, labor, and explaining
only one kind of factor income, wages, thus replacing (1.3) with
(1.3 a) AQ = f(L,),
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sity lectures, by making an early version of the assertion that
would become famous in The Wealth of Nations: "The brewer and
the baker serve us not from benevolence, but from self love."2 2
According to Augustine (and Aquinas following him), the main
reason the hypothetical brewer or baker does not make gifts of
bread or beer to his customers, rather than charging for them, is
not exclusive self-love, but rather, the fact of scarcity: if he shared
his beer or bread equally with everyone, he would leave himself
and his family too little to live on. Exactly the same is true of our
lemonade-producing children: they plan to donate at least part
of their earnings to others, just not to their customers. Augus-
tine, starting from Aristotle's definition that love properly means
willing some good to some person, observed that what it means
to "love your neighbor as yourself' must therefore depend criti-
cally on whether the good in question is "diminished by being
shared with others" 2 3-that is, scarce. When abundant or infi-
nite goods are involved, sharing equally is always possible and,
therefore, morally obligatory. But when scarce goods are
involved, Augustine pointed out, loving your neighbor as yourself
cannot mean loving your neighbor equally with yourself: "Since
you cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those
who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are
brought into closer connection with you." 24
ignoring "nonhuman capital" K. The Wealth of Nations represented an important
advance of this scheme by attempting to account for three factors of produc-
tion-labor (L), reproducible "nonhuman capital" (KR), and land (KT); but
then, Smith reduced them back to one factor by further assuming that both KR
and KT can be produced with labor (L) alone. This amounts to replacing equa-
tions (2.3a) and (2.3b) above with
(2.3c) AK = f(KRiLi,KTi),
(2.3d) ALi = f3(L,) and
(2.3e) AKT, = f4(Li).
Thus, any version of Smith's production function is a linear function of labor
alone, and every product's price is a linear function of the quantity of the labor
required to produce it. The same result could be reached by assuming that the
three different factors are infinitely substitutable for each other. In the real
world, this would mean that a worker could become a machine or chemical (or
vice versa) at will. This assumption is empirically false, and omitting the utility
function means that, while the theory could try to explain the quantity of a
good produced, it could not even pretend to explain the quantity demanded.
This combination of assumptions makes many of the theory's predictions either
empirically false or not testable.
22. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMs 169
(Edwin Carman ed., 1896).
23. See AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, supra note 5, at 6.
24. See id. at 15 ("Further, all men are to be loved equally. But since you
cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the acci-
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Augustine's theory explains why the brewer or baker shares
his beer or bread with his family and friends but not with his
business customers: he does indeed love his customers with a
love of "benevolence" (that is, wishing good to them and thus
treating them honestly) but not, as he loves his family and
friends, with "beneficence" also ("doing good," by donating
scarce goods to them).25 Smith replaced Augustine's empirically
verifiable theory of personal distribution with the mere assump-
tion that no one ever shares his wealth with anyone else. And
under this assumption, it is impossible to accurately describe any
enterprise as simple as our children's lemonade stand.26
Beginning around 1870, "neoclassical" economists, dissatis-
fied with various empirical failures of the classical framework,
restored the theory of utility and reintegrated it with the theories
of production and exchange; but so far, they have not redis-
covered the theory of final distribution.2 v This is why, ever since,
the last three elements have been the basic propositions of neo-
classical economic theory.2 8 They form the famous "scissors" to
which Alfred Marshall likened the structure of economic theory:
the theory of utility, representing the blade of demand; the the-
ory of production, the blade of supply; and the theory of equilib-
rium, the rivet holding the two blades together.29 But the
missing first element is central to explaining the effects of fiscal
policy on fertility and employment because it provides the
description of all gifts and other "transfer payments," which neo-
classical theory cannot explain except by treating them as dis-
guised forms of consumption, production, and/or exchange.3 °
Transfer payments comprise any income not received as
compensation for contributing to current production. And since
dents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection
with you.").
25. See id.
26. Eliminating the final distribution function [equations (1.1) and
(2.1)] altogether would make Smith's system even less logically complete, with
two fewer explanatory equations than unknown variables. But in practice,
Smith implicitly added the restriction, Djj/D = 1, collapsing the equations to:
(1.1) CQj = Yi and
(2.1) CK,+CLi Yi,
which means that no one shares any wealth or income with anyone else. The
actual preferences of the people whose behavior is supposed to be described
are replaced with an assumption that is often (perhaps usually) false. The logic
of the system would require, for example, that every child beget and rear itself.
See generally SMITH, supra note 21.
27. See MUELLER, supra note 17.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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by nature we humans are (as Aristotle observed) not only
"rational," but also "conjugal"3 and "political, 32 animals, it still
makes eminent sense to describe these transfers as being of three
kinds: personal, domestic, and political.
1. Personal Gifts (and Crimes)
At the personal level, transfer payments include the gifts of
their scarce resources that people make to one another, while
crimes depriving others of life or property amount to involuntary
transfer payments from the victim to the criminal.33 The most
fundamental example of personal gifts comprises the gifts a man
and a woman make when they marry, establishing their house-
hold.34 Thus, the household and its property are essentially built
31. See THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 520 (C.I. Litzinger, O.P. ed., Dumb Ox Books 1993) (c. 1271).
32. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 5, at 238.
33. See generally supra notes 15, 26 and accompanying text (describing
equations (1.4) and (2.4)).
34. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 5, at 214. Aristotle
states:
Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is
naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form cities,
inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city,
and reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the
other animals the union only extends to this point, but human beings
live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the
various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided,
and those of the man and woman are different; so they help each
other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock.
Id. Thus, Aristotle notes that a household, say, J1, is created by the marriage of
a man, MI, and a woman, F 1, and its wealth, Wj1, is initially acquired by their
"throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock" of household wealth: WjI
= KmI + I41 + Lm + LFI. This is more than the tautology that would result from
aggregating the possessions of any two random individuals. It means that each
spouse, MI and F1, starts marriage with an initial gift or transfer, TM~jI and TFIJl,
to the new joint family partnership, J1, consisting of all his or her human and
nonhuman wealth:
(1.6a) TMiji = KMI + LmI.
(1.6b) TFI.JI = KnI + LFI.
For the marriage partnership to continue and flourish, the initial gifts must be
followed by a series of gifts by which any new income realized separately by each
spouse (particularly from their "human capital," since it is not alienable) is put
into the "common stock":
(1.6c) TMIjI = YMI, and
(1.6d) TFIJI = Yl.
Henceforth, the married couple determines the distribution of the family's
income or wealth according to a new joint family distribution finction, Dji. For
example, the woman's share in the use of total current family income becomes:
(1.1b) CQFI = YJIDJI:FI/YDj.,i and
(2.1b) CKFI + CLr = YIDJ,:rF/YDl:i.
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around the relationship between a man and a woman, 5 which
normally produces children. 6 If the last part of the definition
ever stopped being true, all households and persons would cease
to exist within a single human lifetime.
2. Domestic "Distributive Justice"
At the domestic level, "transfers" include the gifts that par-
ents jointly make to their children (for example, by paying for
their living and education expenses before they can support
themselves) , or conversely, the gifts that adult children make to
A similar formula applies to every other family member-and, in fact, to every-
one else in the world, for most of whom the distributive share in the family's
resources is zero.
35. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 5, at 214. Aris-
totle declared:
It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found
in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based also on
virtue, if the parties are good; for each has its own virtue and they will
delight in the fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which is
the reason why childless people part more easily); for children are a
good common to both and what is common holds them together.
Id. Following Aristotle, Augustine later boiled down the essentials of marriage
to two-faithful partnership and offspring-with the addition of a third, sacra-
ment, for baptized Christians:
Therefore the good of marriage throughout all nations and all men
stands in the occasion of begetting, and faith of chastity: but so far as it
pertains unto the People of God, also in the sanctity of the Sacra-
ment.... All these are goods, on account of which marriage is a good:
offspring (proles), faith (fides), sacrament (sacramentum).
AUGUSTINE OF Hippo, OF THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE (DE BONO CONJUGALI), availa-
ble at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1309.htmn (last visited Mar. 22,
2006).
36. This gives us the "original" production function for children, who are
each unique and uniquely related to their biological parents. For example, the
initial human capital endowment (L*) of a boy, M 2, whose biological father is
M1 and whose biological mother is F1, may be written:
(2.3g) L*M2 = f(LMI, LFI, K,).
In other words, though the "nonhuman capital" that is necessary to bring a son,
M 2, into being does not have to belong to its biological parents, the "human
capital" does. Once the child is in the world, many other persons, besides its
parents, can and do make additions to this initial endowment, as described by
the general "production function" for "human capital" (2.3b). Yet, it remains
true that, until the child becomes an adult, the bulk of such investments are
typically made by or at the direction of the child's biological parents.
37. For example,
(1.6e) and (2.6e) TjI:M2 = (1 - Y,) DJI:M2 /SDJI,:,
which means that the gift or transfer from the parents,J1, to dependent son, M 2 ,
is determined by his relative significance, Dj:M2 /SDji:I, out of his parents' total
distributed income, Yji.
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support aged parents.38 And because (especially in the last cen-
tury) some of the ancient household's functions have been
increasingly specialized by its modern offshoots, the modern
household, the business firm and nonprofit foundation, "domes-
tic" transfers now also include benefits paid by business firms to
former, retired, or disabled workers and their dependents, as
well as payments made by persons to charitable foundations and
the grants made to recipients by such foundations on behalf of
those donors.
3. Political "Distributive Justice"
At the political level, transfer payments include government
benefits and taxes (the latter amounting to transfers from the
taxpayer to the "common wealth")." Our analysis, therefore,
requires us to rewrite the account, as necessary, in order to suit
the particular agent in question: an individual person, a married
couple, a family with children, or a government. 40 But whatever
38. (1.6f) and (2.6f) TM2.j1 = (1 - YM2) DM2.j1/SDM2:i,
which means that the gift or transfer from (now adult) son, M2, to the parents,
Ji, TM2j1, is determined by their relative significance, DM2j1 /SDM 2:1, out of all the
people among whom the son distributes his income, YM2.
We note that the son's gift at time tn yields a quasi-rate of return on the parents'
gift to the son at time to equal to (TM2j1i(t0)/ TM2J1(M))l/n-l.
39. By including typical taxes and government transfer payments, (1.1)
and (2.1) become
(1.1b) and (2.1b), CQo = Di(1-T) [(1-p)wLi + (1-T) (1-k)rK& + Ti]/PQDij,
where CQ is person e's consumption of economic goods (Q), of which the price
is P, TGI:i is net government transfer payments received by person i, T is the
income tax rate, p is the payroll tax rate and k is the tax rate on property
income. Di is the significance of person i to himself or herself, and YD is the
significance of all persons to person i, including himself or herself.
For realism and simplicity, we should also redefine Y as person I s disposa-
ble (rather than gross) income:
(1.5a) and (2.5a) yi = (1-t)[(1-p)wLi + (1-t)(1-k)rK + Ti]/P, thus preserving
the essential simplicity of:
(1.1) CQ - YiDj/YDj and
(2.1) CK,+CLi= YDii/XDij.
40. Apart from debt service, government outlays are devoted to current
consumption of goods and services, investment, and transfer payments, while
cash flow includes tax receipts (which consist, in the U.S., chiefly of the per-
sonal and corporate income taxes and the payroll tax) borrowing and creation
of fiat money:
(1.7) and (2.7) CKG + AKc + TL + TK = t(wXL®IK) + pwXL + krXK + ABG + YXKGMi
[government budget],
where CG is current consumption (including capital consumption) of govern-
ment goods and services, TL is government transfer payments to persons, TK is
government subsidies to property-owners, t is the income tax rate (assumed to
be equal for labor and property income), p is the payroll tax rate, and k is the
2006]
580 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, LTHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
the change in details, all four elements remain necessary for an
accurate and complete account.
This brief discussion helps us to understand the confusion
of most political debate. There are two kinds ofjustice: justice in
exchange, which concerns private personal wealth, and distribu-
tive justice, which concerns common wealth. In general, libertar-
ians attempt to shrink justice to justice in exchange alone-as if
all goods were private goods-while liberals or collectivists
attempt to shrink all justice to distributive justice alone-as if all
goods were common goods. In reality, the choice is never
either/or, but always both/and, by virtue of the fact that both
private and common goods exist.
III. FiscAL POLICY AND (UN)EMPLOYMENT
As already noted, it is possible to proceed almost directly
from our simple model to a comprehensive discussion of employ-
ment at the national level because we are not attempting, at this
point, to explain the growth of the population or the economy,
but only the shares of the population that are either employed in
various capacities or unemployed. To make our discussion truly
comprehensive, we must account for everyone who could possi-
bly be employed or unemployed. Practically speaking, this
means all adults, now defined as everyone sixteen years and
older. (Before 1947, the definition included those fourteen
tax rate levied only on property income. BG is government debt, and 1AKGMi is
the issue of government fiat money.
Exactly as with personal love and domestic distributive justice, the distribu-
tion of a government's common wealth is determined by the relative signifi-
cance of the persons. For example,
(1.6g and 2.6g) TLU = (1 - YGI) DG1 :i/SDGlj.
That is, a transfer payment from a government, G1, to person i, TU, is deter-
mined by that person's significance relative to all persons who share in the dis-
tribution of such transfers.
We note that, as in the case of transfers between parents and children, the
implicit rate of return on payroll taxes paid at time to, pwL(to), that fund pay-as-
you-go transfer payments to persons received at time t., TL(.), is (TL(.)/
pwL(t0)) '/n--l.
The substance of the concluding recommendations is that, to maximize
both fairness and economic efficiency, the sources and uses of government
funds should be paired in this way: transfer payments to persons should be
funded by payroll taxes, subsidies to property owners by taxes on property
income, general consumption of government-provided goods and services by
an income tax falling equally on labor and property income, borrowing should
be confined to funding investment in government-owned assets, and none of
these activities should be funded by fiat money creation. (That is, FTU = pwXLi,
XTVj = krIK, ZCKGi = (wELl + rIK), ZABGi = ZAKc,, and EAKGM i = 0.)
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years and older.41 ) And the first practical distinction we must
draw is between those in the labor market and those outside the
labor market, often erroneously described as those "working" or
"not working." We have avoided this error by noting, from the
beginning, that a great deal of work and production occurs
outside the market. At one time, nearly all work and production
occurred outside the market, and even today, the production of
many goods, as well as of people, occurs within the household.
So, it is more accurate and fruitful to distinguish between those
working in the labor market and those working outside the labor
market in the household economy. We can exhaustively describe
all adults in the labor market as being either employed civilians,
employed in the military, or unemployed:
U.S. Labor Force Status
% of adult civilian noninstitutional population
100% 100%
80% Meninlabor force 80%
Men employ,
Total labor force 60%60% ------
40% Women in laborfo 
40%
Women employed
20% 20%
0 % 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. 1 1. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 %
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
We find that we have two basic facts to explain. First, what
accounts for the unemployment rate, both as a share of the civil-
ian labor force and as a share of the total adult population? Sec-
ond, what accounts for people's decision to participate in the
labor market and, particularly, the increased share of the adult
population in the labor market since the Second World War? A
closer look reveals a further complication: the labor market
employment of men has steadily declined, while the labor market
employment of women has steadily increased. So the rising
employment/population ratio has resulted from the share of
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES 121-26 (1975).
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adult women employed in the labor market having risen by more
than the labor market employment of men has declined.
If we can account for both facts, we will have explained the
variation in the (generally increasing) share of the adult popula-
tion, employed in the labor market, and the (generally declin-
ing) share, outside the labor market. Let us deal with the
problem of unemployment first.
A. Unemployment as Disequilibrium: Rueffis Law
Our earlier discussion (for example, when we spoke of the
equality of product value and the compensation of the producers
or "factors") assumed ongoing adjustments to changing market
conditions, resulting in a continuous approximation of market
"equilibrium." But unemployment is a case of market dis-equilib-
rium. That is, when we say that a certain percentage of the civil-
ian labor force is currently unemployed, it means that that
proportion of workers is actively seeking a job in the labor mar-
ket but unable to find employment at the prevailing level of
labor compensation. The quantity of labor offered by workers
exceeds the quantity demanded by business firms in that
proportion.
The French economist Jacques Rueff was the first to demon-
strate empirically that variations in unemployment are closely
linked to the relative price of labor and offer an explanation for
its variation. The relation between the two was found to be so
strong that it became known in the 1930s and 1940s as "Rueff s
Law." In Les Variations du Ch6mage en Angleterre [Variations in
Unemployment in England] Rueff showed that the reason for the
unprecedented appearance of chronically high unemployment
in England in the 1920s was a rise in the relative price of labor,
which he measured by the ratio of wage rates to the wholesale
price index.4 2 He traced its cause to the combination of an
unemployment "dole" (instituted in 1911) which was fixed in
nominal terms (that is, so many shillings a week) and a sharp
post-World War I decline in the price level (the deflation
resulted from Britain's decision to return to the gold standard at
the pound's pre-war gold value, despite more than a doubling of
the general price level due to wartime monetary inflation).
42. Jacques Rueff, Les Variations du Ch6mage en Angleterre, 32 REv. POLI-
TIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 425 (1925) [hereinafter Les Variations].
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U.K. Wages & Prices, 1919-1938
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Source: Rueff, Oeuvres Completes, Plon, 1979; II, 2, 265-266.
Rueff's study first appeared in a French academic journal,
and was described in the Financial Times in 1926, but it caused a
sensation when an updated version was reported upon in
London's Times in 1931, just after British unemployment had
risen most sharply. Following Rueffs lead, other researchers
found a similarly strong relationship between the relative price of
labor and unemployment in at least a dozen other countries."
John Maynard Keynes's General Theory implicitly depends on
Rueffs Law, plus the additional assumption that wage rates are
fixed in nominal but not real terms.4 4 "The astonishing thing is
not that this relationship exists," Rueff modestly remarked in his
memoirs, "but that it should astonish anyone. 4 5
43. Jean Denuc, Les Fluctuations Comparges du Ch6mage et des Salaires dans
Quelques Pays de 1919 d 1929 [Comparative Fluctuations in Unemployment and Sala-
ries in Several Countries from 1919 to 1929], BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GENERALE
DE LA FRANCE (1930) (Fr.).
44. Keynes cited Rueffs wage/price calculations to support his assump-
tion of downward "stickiness" of wages:
Yet it might be a provisional assumption of a rigidity of money-wages,
rather than of real wages, which would bring our theory nearest to the
facts. For example, money-wages in Great Britain during the turmoil
and uncertainty and wide price fluctuations of the decade 1924-1934
were stable within a range of 6 per cent., whereas real wages fluctuated
by more than 20 per cent.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY 276 (1936). But while adopting downward "stickiness" of wages as a gen-
eral assumption, Keynes did not acknowledge Rueff's explanation for it: the
unemployment "dole," which, at the time (like chronic unemployment), was
almost unique to the United Kingdom.
45. 1 JACQUES RUEFF, OEUVRES COMPLtTES [COMPLETE WORKS] 96 (1977).
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"Rueff's Law" Discovered
U.K. Wage/Price Ratio & Unemployment, 1919-1938
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Rueffs original study was published six months before
Irving Fisher, the great American economist, published what
would later be called a "Phillips Curve" explanation of unemploy-
ment.46 Whereas Rueff explained joblessness as a function of the
relative price of labor, Fisher (like Phillips after him) explained
unemployment as a function of the rate of price inflation. The
Phillips Curve relationship seemed to work for about a decade
after it was announced, but broke down when the Bretton Woods
monetary system exploded in 1971, resulting in both higher
inflation and higher unemployment. But as we will see, Rueff's
Law, suitably updated, has held up empirically. The necessary
updating takes advantage of the greater detail of national income
data now available, and takes into account taxes and transfer pay-
ments-which are no longer small enough to be ignored-when
measuring the relative price of labor.
B. Rueff's Law Forgotten and Rediscovered
Rueff's Law was almost universally forgotten by economists
after World War II. I was intrigued by its apparent success
before, and puzzled by its apparent disappearance after, the Sec-
ond World War, but did not get the opportunity to investigate
the reasons until my forecasting firm was hired to analyze the
economic policies of various governments that were wrestling
with apparently intractable problems of unemployment (the first
such study was commissioned by a French non-profit foundation
46. See Irving Fisher, A Statistical Relation Between Unemployment and Price
Changes, INT'L LAB. REV. (1926). AW. Phillips was a British economist who in
the late 1950s discovered an apparent tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment.
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which was advising the "transition team" of Edouard Balladur,
who was elected prime minister of France in 1993).
My research found that Rueff's Law is very much alive, and
explains the variations of unemployment in economies as large
as the United States and as small as Puerto Rico-but that its
measurement needed to be updated. The updating of Rueffs
Law involves two modifications, not in theory but in the tech-
nique of measurement. Both modifications were suggested by
Rueff, but they could not have been accomplished with the statis-
tics available to economists and policymakers before the Second
World War. The first modification is to use a truly comprehen-
sive measure of the cost of labor, by adjusting the average rate of
labor compensation for both product prices and labor productiv-
ity (instead of adjusting for product prices alone). Rueff had
carefully noted that the relation between real wages and unem-
ployment "can be maintained only during sufficiently short peri-
ods and absent major changes in technology or working
conditions."4 7 The second necessary modification is to adjust
labor costs for the effects of government taxes and "transfer pay-
ments" (such as the unemployment benefits upon which Rueff
had focused).48
To understand Rueff's Law, we must draw out the underly-
ing relationships implied in our general discussion. Our discus-
sion implies that unemployment is a direct function of the
"price" of labor. But what, exactly, is the relative price of labor?
Obviously it has to do with the level of labor compensation. But
like all prices, labor compensation has a meaning only in relation
to other prices. From the point of view of a worker, whether a
wage of five dollars an hour is decent or lousy depends, for exam-
ple, on whether a glass of lemonade costs five dollars or twenty-
five cents. And for the prospective employer, whether it is profit-
able to employ a worker to produce the lemonade will also
depend on whether the glass of lemonade can be sold for five
dollars or twenty-five cents. So the relative price of labor has to
take both pay and prices into account. But the cost of labor is
also affected by labor productivity. If a business firm could
double the quantity of goods produced with an hour of labor
while wage rates and prices remained the same, it would effec-
tively cut the cost of labor in half. But in a competitive market,
all units of labor (and capital) are paid incomes equal to what
47. 2 JACQUEs RUEFF, L'Assurance-Ch6mage: Cause du Ch6mage Permanent
[Unemployment Insurance: Cause of Permanent Unemployment], in OUEVRES COM-
PLtTES 211 (1977).
48. See Rueff, Les Variations, supra note 42; see also infra note 53, MUELLER
1994a at 7; MUELLER 1994b at 3, 17.
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the last unit adds to output. If labor productivity suddenly
doubled while product prices stayed the same, businesses would
find that to take full advantage of the change, that is, maximize
their profits, they would need to keep hiring more workers until
real wage rates doubled, at which point the relative price of labor
would have risen back to its initial level.
To a prospective employer, therefore, the effective "price" of
labor is the labor compensation or wage agreed with the worker,
adjusted for two things: the selling price of the finished product
and the worker's productivity. This is sometimes called the "effi-
ciency wage." The higher the efficiency wage, the lower the
demand for workers; the lower the efficiency wage, the higher
the demand to hire employees.
C. From Lemonade to the National Income and Product Accounts
What is true of the purchase of a single product from a sin-
gle firm remains true if we add up all the purchases of all prod-
ucts from all firms: namely, total factor compensation is equal to
total spending on final products. This means that, just as we
could view the purchase of lemonade either as spending on a
product or as compensation to its producers, we can view the
whole economy either as total spending on final products or as
the total income of their producers.49 The national income and
product accounts attempt to add up all individual transactions as
total spending on final products (gross domestic or national
product: GDP or GNP) and as total labor and property compen-
sation received by producers (gross domestic or national income:
GDI or GNI)."5
Looking at the income side, considered before the effect of
taxes and government benefits, about two-thirds of Gross
National Income (the counterpart to Gross National Product, or
GNP) consists of labor compensation (wages, salaries, and fringe
benefits), while about one-third is property compensation (divi-
49. National income and product data pertain only to "final" products,
since including the value of raw materials and intermediate goods, as well as
finished goods, would result in multiple counting of the same "value added" in
production.
50. "National" refers to the production actually owned and received as
income by a country's residents, while "domestic" refers to the income gener-
ated by production within a country, without regard to whether the income is
ultimately received by residents or by foreigners. If our purpose is to maximize
the incomes of the country's residents, then the appropriate measures are gross
or net national product (GNP or NNP) and their counterparts, gross or net
national income (GNI or NNI). "Gross" means before, and "net" means after,
subtracting the value of capital consumed in production, as well as indirect
(sales) taxes.
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dends, retained profits, interest, rents, and royalties). The graph
"Labor Compensation as a Share of U.S. Gross National Income"
shows this relationship.
Labor Compensation as a Share of U.S. Gross National Income
Pretax measure is stable and largely uncorrelated to unemployment.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0 s' IIII I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I
29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01
Source: Commerce & Labor Depts.; calculated by LBMC LLC
In doing the calculations for the whole national economy,
we discover that the relative price of labor or "efficiency wage" is
the same as the share of labor compensation in total national income.51
This is a great convenience in calculation, since it means that we
can measure the economy-wide relative price of labor without
actually knowing the average hourly wage rate, the number of
hours worked, the level of productivity, or total real output: all
we need to know are total labor compensation and total national
income.
Before taxes and government benefits, gross labor compen-
sation typically makes up about two-thirds, and property compen-
sation about one-third, of gross national income, and those
shares are remarkably constant over time. We noted that this is
presumably because workers consistently contribute about two-
thirds and productive property about one-third the value of gross
51. Why is this? The relative price of labor is derived by dividing the rate
of labor compensation per hour by both product prices and labor productivity.
Let w be labor compensation per hour, L the number of hours worked, P the
index of product prices, and Q net output. Then the "product wage" is w/P,
and labor productivity (output per hour) is Q/L. So the relative price of labor
is (w/P)/(Q/L) = wL/PQ. But wL is total labor compensation, and PQ is the
value of total output. PQ (net of nonhuman capital consumption and indirect
taxes) is also equal to national income. Therefore the relative price of labor is
the same as labor's share of national income. As long as we know the aggregate
value of labor compensation (wL) and national income (PQ), we can measure
the relative price of labor without actually knowing w, L, P, or Q.
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output.5 2 While this gives us a comprehensive overview of labor
costs, the income shares calculated in this way do not have a par-
ticularly close correlation with the unemployment rate. This is
because the cost of labor has been calculated without taking into
account three important realities: taxes, transfer payments, and
capital consumption. In particular, taxes and benefits must be
included because they affect people's behavior. Perhaps ignor-
ing them might have been justifiable seventy or eighty years ago,
when both were relatively small in relation to the total economy.
But today we cannot ignore all the taxes and subsidies, which are
specifically designed to affect behavior and transfer income
between and among workers and owners of productive property.
D. Parental "Economic Policy" and the Lemonade Stand
To understand the effects of fiscal policy on
(un)employment-we must return to our analogy of the lemon-
ade stand and put ourselves in the place of the children's par-
ents, who, after observing the children's efforts, decide to help
them without taking over the operation of their lemonade stand
(which would be equivalent to its "nationalization" by the
government).
1. Price Regulation
The quantity of a product demanded by customers, we con-
cluded, diminishes as the price increases, and there is generally
only one price at which the quantity demanded equals the quan-
tity supplied. What would happen if the parents overruled the
children about the price at which they had decided to sell their
lemonade-say, telling them they must sell lemonade for fifty,
rather than twenty-five cents a glass? This is essentially what the
government does when it attempts to regulate the prices of prod-
ucts. If the selling price were already at the level at which the
quantity of lemonade demanded just equaled the quantity
offered for sale, raising the selling price would cause the quantity
demanded to fall short of the quantity supplied, thus creating an
unsellable surplus of lemonade. Likewise, lowering the selling
price below the "equilibrium" price would increase the quantity
demanded, but not the quantity supplied, thus creating a
shortage of lemonade. In both cases, the amount actually sold
would not be equal to the amount demanded, but rather the
lesser of the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded. The
52. YQ = XKaXL l -a, where a is the share of total product value contributed
by all nonhuman capital 1K, and 1-a the share contributed by all human capi-
tal EL; empirically, a _ 0.3-0.4, so 1-a = 0.6-0.7.
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same principle explains why government price controls, if
enforced, always cause either a shortage or a surplus in a compet-
itive market. Below-market rent controls create a housing
shortage, below-market interest ceilings a credit shortage, and
below-market gasoline price controls a gasoline shortage.
2. Regulation of Compensation
Since the compensation is ultimately determined by the
product's price, similar effects occur when the government
attempts to set the rates of compensation of the productive fac-
tors as when product prices are directly controlled: that is, a sur-
plus or shortage of the factor results. The most important
example of a regulatory control on factor compensation is the
minimum wage. This would be like the parents insisting that the
child who supplied only labor be compensated at a certain rate
per hour. If the minimum rate is set at a relatively low level, say
one dollar an hour when the children's analysis had indicated
the rate should be at two dollars an hour out of revenues of three
dollars an hour, the regulation has no effect. But if the rate were
set above the level that would equalize the demand for and sup-
ply of labor-say three dollars an hour-labor compensation
would absorb all revenues, causing the child "proprietor" to take
all the property home. The result would be a labor surplus-in
other words, unemployment-but without providing any alter-
nate source of income to the worker, who would be unemployed
as a result. The minimum wage makes it illegal, in effect, to hire
unskilled workers at what their skills are currently worth, and
thus improve their skills and earn a higher wage. So they remain
unemployed and unskilled. By removing the unskilled from the
labor market, the minimum wage may raise the wages of skilled
workers (which is probably why it is championed by labor
unions) but reduces the income of all workers as a group.
3. Product Subsidies
Government subsidies or benefits paid to producers can also
create shortages or surpluses, but with an important difference
compared with price controls. In this case, the surplus created
by an above-market price is purchased by the government-
rather like parents who insist that the children set the price of
lemonade higher (say, fifty cents a glass when most customers are
willing to pay only twenty-five cents), but offer to buy any lemon-
ade that remained unsold at that price. That way, the children's
income would be increased at the expense of the parents. How-
ever, the benefit or subsidy would also encourage the children to
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produce more lemonade to increase their incomes, thus making
it potentially very expensive to the parent.
In the same way, farm price supports increase farmers'
incomes, but also create government-owned "lakes" of milk or
wine and "mountains" of unsold butter, cheese, cotton, sugar,
and wheat. The surplus products cannot be sold by the govern-
ment without driving the market price below the level which it is
the whole point of the policy to support. To avoid this, an alter-
native method might be to offer to pay the children twenty-five
cents for every glass they manage to sell at any price. The subsidy
might induce the children to make so much more lemonade that
they had to lower the price to customers to ten cents a glass to
sell it all, but the children would receive thirty-five cents a glass.
(However, this would undercut the price of any other lemonade
stands in the vicinity.)
4. Transfer Payments to Persons
Something analogous to government subsidies for products
happens in the labor market when the government offers "trans-
fer payments" to workers. But the economic consequences
depend largely upon conditions on which the payments are
granted. And transfer payments involve basically three kinds of
conditions, with three different results on the employment and
income of workers. The first category requires people to be in
the labor force but be unemployed to qualify. This would be like
the children's parents offering to pay the child "worker" when-
ever he was not working at the lemonade stand, but at a rate near
what the child could earn by so working. This category includes
unemployment insurance and welfare payments to the able-bod-
ied that, after paying costs of commuting, etc., exceed the value
of labor compensation available from a private job. Just as a
product subsidized at an above-market price causes the govern-
ment to purchase the surplus that customers are unwilling to
buy, the result of unemployment insurance or welfare to the
able-bodied is a surplus of labor that cannot be sold to private
employers at the going wage, but which the government, in
effect, chooses to purchase at a higher rate. The result is a
reduction in market employment and an equal increase in unem-
ployment. The second category requires the recipient to be
outside the labor force. Such benefits include pay-as-you-go pen-
sions conditioned on retiring from the labor force, as well as disa-
bility insurance, which also requires the recipient to be fully or
partially disabled from working. This would be like the chil-
dren's parents offering to pay them, say, to do their homework
instead of running the lemonade stand. The result may be a
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reduction in labor market employment, but not an increase in
unemployment, since to receive the benefit, the recipients must
leave the labor force. The third category requires the recipient
to be employed. This category includes an Earned Income Tax
Credit or "workfare." Such benefits are analogous to an arrange-
ment by which one of the parents donated part of his or her own
salary to pay the child "worker" an extra dollar an hour in addi-
tion to any compensation the child derived from making and
selling lemonade. This kind of benefit neither reduces employ-
ment nor increases unemployment of the recipients. Instead,
income is transferred from employed workers with higher
incomes to employed workers with lower incomes.
Thus the problem of unemployment is inextricably linked to
the question of the overall distribution of income between work-
ers and property owners-and particularly to the policies
adopted by modern governments to affect that distribution. The
updated version of Rueffs Law sheds a great deal of light in pin-
pointing which social policies, ostensibly intended to help the
poor and particularly low-income workers, actually do so-and
which policies actually worsen the situation of those they are sup-
posed to help. I summarized my findings about Rueff's Law in a
series of reports, which tested the predictions of the earlier stud-
ies against the actual results of U.S. welfare reform.53
To calculate the relative price of labor accurately, we must
therefore make three adjustments.
First, taxes on workers should be subtracted from net labor
compensation (just as taxes on property income must be sub-
tracted from net property compensation). Second, transfer pay-
ments to persons add to the net cost of labor compensation
(since the payments are not received by owners of property),
while any subsidies to property owners should be added to net
property compensation. Third, capital consumption must be
subtracted, because using up wealth requires investing current
income to replace it. Subtracting capital consumption (and sales
53. See JOHN MUELLER, THE LBMC REPORT, A CHALLENGE TO CONVEN-
TIONAL LABOR-MARKET WISDOM (May 1994), available at http://www.eppc.org/
docLib/20050922_achallegetoconventional.pdf; JOHN MUELLER, THE LBMC
REPORT, How CAN WAGES FALL WHILE UNEMPLOYMENT RISES? (Mar. 1994),
available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20050922-howcanwagesfall.pdf;
JOHN D. MUELLER, THE LBMC REPORT, TRANSFER PAYMENTS: CAUSE OF PERMA-
NENT UNEMPLOYMENT (May 1993);JOHN D. MUELLER, THE LBMC REPORT, THE
ANSWER TO THREE PUZZLES: WELFARE REFORm LOWERED UNEMPLOYMENT (July
1999), available at http://www.eppc.org/publications/publD.236 7 /pub-detail.
asp.
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taxes) from gross national income (GNI) leaves net national
income (NNI). 4
In other words, though net income is originally produced
and earned by two factors-workers and owners of productive
property-the income is finally split three ways: part goes to
workers as take-home pay after taxes and transfers to employed
workers; part goes to property owners as property compensation
after taxes and subsidies; and part is transferred to persons who
do not contribute to current output, as "transfer payments."
Under these circumstances, the net cost of labor is no longer the
share of income actually received by employed workers, but
rather the share of total net income not received by owners of
property-which is equal to take-home pay plus net transfer pay-
ments to persons.5 5
To estimate the relative price of labor on this basis, I went to
the national income and product accounts, and calculated
pretax labor compensation (including fringe benefits and the
government's estimate of self-employed labor income, which had
to be reconstructed before 1947), plus after-tax transfer pay-
ments to persons, minus personal and payroll taxes on labor
compensation.
Including taxes and government transfer payments reveals
that the actual change in workers' take-home pay as a share of
national income is often quite different from the share as con-
ventionally calculated without the adjustments. 56 For example,
take-home pay rose from 2000 to 2004 as a share of national
income while the conventional calculation showed the labor
share declining-a fact which was made the basis of much ill-
54. However, as noted above, the government calculates the consumption
of nonhuman but not human capital, which is equally real.
55. L/Lpo, = cl + b(1-T) [(1-p)wL+TL]/(PQ-CK); that is, employment as a
share of the labor force is a function of labor's net share of national income,
where c1 is a constant, L is actual employment, and Lin, is the labor force (maxi-
mum potential employment), so L, - L is the number of (hours or workers)
unemployed and 1-L/L,, is the unemployment rate. When unemployment is
eliminated, L=L,.,. Since actual employment can never exceed potential
employment, and actual employment is a function of labor's share of total
income, labor's net share of total income can never fall below 1-a _= 0.6-0.7. No
matter how "greedy" employers are, their greed will cause them to hire workers,
thus raising workers' incomes, as long as it is profitable to do so. It stops being
profitable when L=Lpo,.
56. See, e.g., PAUL GOMME & PETER RUPERT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVE-
LAND, MEASURING LABOR'S SHARE OF INCOME (2004), available at http://www.
clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/No7NovO4.pdf; Michael R. Pakko,
Labor's Share, NAT'L ECON. TRENDS, Aug. 2004, available at http://research.st
louisfed.org/publications/net/20040801/cover.pdf.
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informed controversy and many well-intended but misguided
policy recommendations.
Labor Cost Before and After Taxes and Transfers
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Net labor cost = (pretax labor compensation , transfers to persons - taxes on labor)Inational income
Conventional labor cost ratio = pretax labor compensationlGDP
Moreover, unlike the gross measure, the net cost of labor
calculated in this way is highly correlated with the unemploy-
ment rate. The following chart shows the relationship for the
United States since 1929 (the earliest year for which sufficiently
detailed statistics are available).
Shares of Net National Income & Unemployment
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Net labor cost = compensation plus transfer payments less taxes on labor.
Source: Commerce & Labor Departments; calculated by LBMC LLC
The higher the net labor cost, the higher the unemploy-
ment rate. Labor's share of actual national income reached sev-
enty-eight percent at the depth of the Great Depression; at the
same time, unemployment peaked at nearly twenty-three per-
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cent.5 7 The lower the net labor cost, the lower the unemploy-
ment rate. But, again as theory predicts, there is a limit, set by
full employment, below which labor's net share of national
income has never fallen. The lowest net labor share of national
income since 1929 was about fifty-nine percent, and coincided
with the lowest unemployment rate on record: one percent at the
peak of the World War II boom in 1943. Since then, labor's
share of national income has always been higher and has been
mirrored by changes in unemployment.
Yet while labor's net share of national income, including
transfer payments, has risen since World War II, the share
received by employed wage-earners has declined. The entire dif-
ference is due to transfer payments to persons who are not
employed in the labor market.
If we plot unemployment against the total net labor cost for
all years, we have the updated version of Rueff's Law-in effect,
the demand curve for labor in the United States.
Rueff's Law: U.S. Labor Market
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On average over the whole period, each 1 percentage point
change in net labor cost, as a share of national income, has been
associated with a 1.1 percentage point change in the rate of
employment in the opposite direction, and in the unemploy-
ment rate in the same direction. (Labor share up 1 percentage
point: employment rate down and unemployment rate up 1.1
percentage point; labor share down 1 percentage point: employ-
57. As currently calculated. Before World War I, workers employed on
public works projects were counted as unemployed, which raised the peak rate
reported at the time to about twenty-five percent.
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ment rate up and unemployment rate down 1.1 percentage
point.)
5. Net Labor Costs and National Output/Income
Since both workers and productive property are necessary
for any increase in production, in approximately constant pro-
portions, every increase in unemployment is associated with a
proportional decline in output relative to the level that could be
achieved if all workers were fully employed. 58 This difference is
often described as the "GDP gap," but for our purposes it makes
more sense to express it in terms of the "national income gap."
U.S. Net Labor Cost vs. "National Income Gap"
100% 100%
90% 90%
80% - 80%
70% -70%
60% Labor's share of actual national income - 60%
50% 11111 1111111111 1 1111 1111111111 111 111 [ 11111111111111 111111 11111111IlL 50%
29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01
If we plot the relationship between the net cost of labor and
the "national income gap" for all years, we find that the two
series trace a relationship quite similar to that between the net
cost of labor and the unemployment rate. This is not surprising,
since the gap is estimated in relation to some measure of full
employment. The only difference is that the change in real
national income is twice as large as the change in employment.
The main reason is that national income includes both labor and
property compensation, and property compensation varies by a
multiple of the corresponding change in labor compensation.
58. NI/Nlpo, = c(L/Lpo); empirically, c=2. When expressed in terms of
GDP, this relationship is sometimes called "Okun's Law." The output gap is
derived from that of the Congressional Budget Office, which is based on CBO's
estimate of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, which has
frequently changed. The measure used here is based on output if all workers
were employed: zero unemployment.
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Rueff's Law: U.S. Product Market
C- As net labor cost falls, output (=income) rises.
0
C- 100% -
3 90% -
3 80% -
0
. 70% -35
o 60%
550%
(D 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80%Z
Net labor cost, % of national income by year (e.g., 33=1933)
R-square = 0.893 # pts = 76
y = 2.25 + -2.18x
Over the period since 1929, every one percentage-point rise
in the U.S. net labor cost has been associated with about a 2.2
percentage-point decline of national income below its potential
at full employment.
6. The Net Effect on Real Labor Income
We have found that economic policies (or any other circum-
stances) that alter the net shares of total national income
between workers and property owners have two effects, which
work in opposite directions. On the one hand, reducing the rela-
tive income share received by property owners necessarily
increases the relative remaining share, which goes to employed
workers and recipients of transfer payments. (I will call this com-
bined share "net labor cost" for simplicity.) On the other hand,
reducing the relative share of net income received by property
owners raises the unemployment rate and lowers total actual
national income, including the labor compensation of employed
workers, in absolute terms.
Thus not only the cost of labor and employment, but also
total output and income, are all tied in a unique relationship.
Labor's net share of income is inversely related to employment;
but employment is positively related to output and income
(including labor income). Total labor income including take-
home pay and transfer payments is positively related to national
income, and inversely related to labor's share of national income.
Why is this? For any given equipment, organization, and
technology, each extra hour of labor has less equipment to work
with, and so adds less to output than the previous hour. There-
fore total employment, output, and national income increase in
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absolute terms; but the "efficiency wage"-the share of labor
compensation in total national income-must fall. However,
labor's share of income must stop falling when full employment
is reached since, if no more labor is forthcoming, labor's relative
contribution to extra output can not decline any further. Simi-
larly, labor's income share rises with unemployment, because the
last unit of labor hired has more capital to work with; but real
labor income falls, because employment and national income are
cut back.
It is crucial, therefore, to know the net result of both effects;
for this will determine whether workers, the owners of "human
capital," are better or worse off if they seek a larger share of
lower national income or a smaller share of a larger national
income. And we can answer this by comparing the shares of
actual national income with potential national income, which is
the total national income that would be realized if all workers
were employed.
Shares of Actual vs. Potential National Income
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The comparison cannot be taken as precise, but does indi-
cate the general order of magnitudes involved. The most signifi-
cant fact is that while net labor income (take-home pay plus net
transfer payments) has never fallen below sixty-two percent of
actual national income, it also has never exceeded sixty-six percent
of potential national income (though it has fallen as low as fifty
percent, coinciding with the Depression peak in net labor costs
as a share of actual national income). What this means is that,
under the best of circumstances, the gains in net labor income
due to a larger share of national income have never significantly
exceeded the absolute losses caused by a fall in national income;
but the losses of net labor income associated with higher unem-
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ployment have often significantly exceeded the gains from an
increased share.
This answers the question whether workers as a group can
increase their real income by ceasing to be employed in the labor
market and collecting transfer payments while unemployed or
remaining outside the labor force instead. Rather, it strongly
implies that most transfer payments are inherently funded by
reducing the take-home pay of employed workers. It also points
to the central importance of measures that will increase earning
ability-potential labor income-particularly through increased
education.
7. Different Transfer Payments, Different Effects on Shares of
Income
The same analysis permits us to break the net cost of labor
down into its components, and thereby see the different eco-
nomic results of different tax-and-transfer programs. All transfer
payments to persons represent, in effect, a purchase of labor ser-
vices by the government, subject to certain conditions. Generally
speaking, these conditions are the most decisive feature of any
such program, because they largely determine who ultimately
pays for the transfer payments. From this point of view, we
noted, there are three basic kinds of transfer payments to per-
sons: 1. Transfer payments to the unemployed, 2. Transfer payments to
persons outside the labor force, and 3. Transfer payments conditioned on
being employed in the labor market. Moreover, our theory suggested
that unemployment will be increased by the first, but not the sec-
ond and third, kinds of transfer payments. Therefore, when we
look at transfer payments, we should find that transfer payments
to the unemployed raise labor's share of national income, while
transfer payments to persons outside the labor force are matched
by a reduction in take-home pay as a share of national income.
(Both should reduce labor market employment and lower mar-
ket production and real national income.) And this is in fact
what the data tell us.
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Components of U.S. Net Labor Cost
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Note: Labor income = labor compensation, less taxes on labor compensation, plus transfer payments.
The graph shows that, apart from cyclical variations, the rise
in labor's share of income since the Second World War is
approximately equal to the rise of benefits to the unemployed
(mostly unemployment insurance and welfare to the able-bod-
ied), while the fall in take-home pay is equal to the rise of bene-
fits to persons outside the labor force (mostly transfers to the
aged and disabled).
While the effect of fiscal policy on unemployment is unam-
biguous, its effect on overall labor market participation is not.
This is because government transfer payments to persons are in
some measure substitutes for transfer payments between men
and women within the household. Marriage involves a specializa-
tion of roles, in which one partner (usually, but not necessarily
the woman) produces more goods and services that are directly
consumed within the household, while the other (usually, but
not necessarily the man) earns more labor market compensation
by participating more in market production. Generally, the
choice is made depending on each partner's labor market earn-
ings ability and whether the couple is raising children. Since
men's average lifetime labor market earnings are on average
about twice as high as women's, 59 it is usually the husband who
works more in the labor market than the wife. The current series
on labor market employment begins only in 1947, but the co-
variation in transfer payments as a share of national income and
men's and women's labor market employment suggests that with-
59. See, e.g., MUELLER, THE ANSWER To THREE PUZZLES, supra note 53.
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out any transfer payments, the labor market employment of men
would be about eighty-nine percent and the labor market
employment of women would be about twenty-five percent.60 As
the share of government transfer payments in national income
has risen, the labor force participation of men has fallen, while
the labor force participation of women has risen. The employ-
ment/population ratio for men has fallen about two percentage
points for each one percentage point increase in transfer pay-
ments as a share of national income.6 But for women, the rela-
tionship is more complicated. As with men, the employment/
population ratio has fallen about two percentage points with
each one percentage point increase in transfer payments condi-
tioned on being unemployed (mostly unemployment insurance
and welfare to the able-bodied).62 But women's employment/
population ratio has risen about four percentage points for each
one percentage point increase in transfer payments to persons
outside the labor force.6 This is partly because the rise of trans-
fer payments has lowered take-home pay for all workers as a
share of national income.64 Unless they are disabled, most mar-
ried women under age sixty-five do not qualify for such transfer
payments, but many have entered the labor force to help make
up for the relative decline of earnings by husbands-a decline,
however, which is reinforced by the increased supply of highly
educated women in an economy based increasingly on knowl-
edge rather than physical strength.65
U.S. Transfer Payments vs. Labor Market Employment
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Thus we have our answers to the two questions that we set
out to answer about the effects of fiscal policy on employment.
First, the variation in the unemployment rate is almost entirely
explained by the variation in the net cost of labor as a share of
national income. Fiscal policy increases unemployment when
transfer payments to persons increase the net labor share of
national income, and this can occur in two ways: first, when trans-
fer payments are conditioned on not being employed in the
labor market (as with unemployment insurance and welfare for
the able-bodied), and second, when transfer payments to persons
are funded by taxes on property income rather than labor
income. Second, the overall labor force participation and the
employment/population ratio have risen because the labor force
participation of women has risen over the past half-century by
more than the labor force participation of men has fallen. The
labor force participation of women has risen and the labor force
participation of men has fallen for the same reason: the rise in
government transfer payments to persons, which substitute for
the transfers that occur within the household between married
men and married women.
IV. FIsCAL POLICY AND FERTILITY
When beginning our discussion of the relations of fiscal pol-
icy to employment, we were able to assume that the population
and labor force were given. However, we warned that the
assumption would not be tenable when discussing fiscal policy
and fertility, since fertility concerns precisely whether and in
what measure each generation of adults replaces itself by having
children. A surprisingly large and politically influential number
of economists make exactly that erroneous assumption when dis-
cussing fiscal policies such as taxation and Social Security.66 But
it will be more enlightening to focus instead on the most sophisti-
cated economic theories of fertility, most of which are either
derived from or reactions to the work of Gary S. Becker, who
does not make that error.
When Becker's elder University of Chicago colleague Theo-
dore W. Schultz rediscovered Aristotle's theory of the household
66. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggre-
gate Capital Accumulation, 82J. OF POL. ECON. 5, 905 (1974); Martin Feldstein,
Does the United States Save Too Little? AMER. ECON. Rv., Feb. 1977, at 116; Martin
Feldstein, Fiscal Policies, Capital Formation and Capitalism (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 4885, 1994); Martin Feldstein & Andrew
Samwick, The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6055, 1997).
2006]
602 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
as a producing unit,6 7 Becker aspired to become its foremost the-
orist. The strength of Becker's approach is precisely its treat-
ment of household production of "human capital," which proved
far more fruitful than earlier theories that treated the size and
useful skills of the population as given.68 The main drawback is
one shared with all varieties of neoclassical economic theory: the
absence of the element of theory that describes our preferences
for people.69
Perhaps Becker's earliest succinct description of what he
and George J. Stigler came to call the "economic approach to
human behavior" is this:
In the standard theory all consumers behave similarly in
the sense that they all maximize the same thing-utility or
satisfaction. It is only a further extension then to argue
that they all derive that utility from the same "basic
pleasures" or preference function, and differ only in their
ability to produce these "pleasures. '" 70
In the same place, Becker argued that "The utility function
should pertain exclusively to preferences; it should deal with the
final objects of choice by the consumer unit. '71 This fails to rec-
ognize that all persons have two kinds of preferences: prefer-
ences for persons, which are expressed in the distribution of
their resources, and preferences for economic goods, which are
expressed in the content of those resources.
Becker justified his assumption of universally identical,
unchanging preferences by the absence of a theory of preferences
in economic theory: "Since economists generally have had little
to contribute, especially in recent times, to the understanding of
how preferences are formed, preferences are assumed not to
change substantially over time, nor to be very different between
wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different
societies and cultures. 72
In other words, Becker begins by identifying "standard the-
ory" with the version of neoclassical theory, which interprets util-
ity in the peculiar utilitarian sense, as a "thing"-a synonym for
pleasure-rather than an order of preference, which is a relation
67. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, AM. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 1961, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HuMAN, BEHAVIOR 145
(1976).
71. Id. at 146.
72. Id. at 5.
HOW DOES FISCAL POLICY AFFECT THE AMERICAN?
between a person and a thing.73 This is sometimes described as
"cardinal" as opposed to "ordinal" utility. Becker then proceeds
to argue that these basic pleasures are the same for all persons
and for each person over time, which might be called the "Ben-
tham-Becker-Stigler assumptions:" the "final objects of choice"
are identified with the "basic commodities" listed in the utility
function; these "basic commodities" are said to include persons
(for example, "children"); they are identified with Jeremy Ben-
tham's list of pleasures; and "tastes" for these "final objects" are
assumed to be identical constants for everyone. 7 ' But the Ben-
tham-Becker-Stigler assumptions mean that humans are not free
to choose or alter their fundamental preferences, either for com-
modities or for persons.
According to the "economic approach to human behavior,"
rather than four elements, economic theory contains only three:
utility, production, and a "budget constraint. 75
A. Utility
Becker theorizes that the "final objects of choice" are certain
"basic commodities," which he identifies with the satisfaction of
Jeremy Bentham's list of fifteen (or twenty-two) basic, supposedly
instinctive pleasures. 76 Each basic commodity is to be under-
stood as a constant because, as Becker and Stigler put it, it is "the
same to all men" and "stable over time."77
The utility of "basic commodities" is not always uniquely
assigned to a single person. Becker defines an altruist as some-
one who gains utility from the utility of others.7 s So when two
people are mutually altruistic, the result is a "hall of mirrors": A's
utility increases B's utility, which in turn increases A's utility,
which increases B's utility, and so on.7 9 Becker concedes that
these overlapping and interacting utility functions entail an "infi-
73. See, e.g., id.
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See, e.g., id. at 134-35 (replacing both the equilibrium conditions and
final distribution function).
76. See R.T. Michael & Gary S. Becker, On the New Theory of Consumer
Behavior, 75 THE SWEDISH J. OF ECON. 378 (1973), reprinted in BECKER, supra note
70, at 131 (rewriting the utility function as (2.1a) U = U(Z 1,. . Z.) and adding
the restriction (2.1b) Zj = bj, a constant).
77. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 24-29 (1996) (citing
George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, AMER.
ECON. REv., Mar. 1977, at 76).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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nite regress""° but argues that with sufficiently restrictive assump-
tions about the degree of altruism, the interactions need not
involve actually infinite utility. However, as we will see, these
restrictive assumptions are often contradicted by the empirical
facts about behavior.
B. Production
According to Becker, households "combine time and market
goods to produce [the] more basic commodities that directly
enter their utility functions.""1
C. Equilibrium
Corresponding to the statement of equilibrium conditions
in the scholastic system, Becker gives what he calls each house-
hold's "resource constraint.8s2 This includes not only market
labor and property compensation received from market activities
but also any products produced and consumed outside the mar-
ket in the household economy.
D. The Missing Equation
Becker's three equations are broadly similar in form and
identical in function to the last first three of the four in the "neo-
scholastic" system we have used. Comparing the two systems,
however, reveals that the neoclassical system as exemplified by
Becker's theory seems to be missing an equation: the one that
specifies the final distribution of economic goods among per-
80. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82J. OF POL. ECON. 1063,
1063-91 (1974), reprinted in BECKER, supra note 70, at 253.
81. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, ECON. J., Sept. 1965,
at 493, reprinted in BECKER, supra note 70, at 89. This appears to be Becker's
earliest description of the production function, in which he writes the produc-
tion function as follows:
(2.3c) Zj = Jfx 1  .... Xn; tl,. tn).
Equation (2.3c) is similar in form to our (2.3b) above, except that the product
is a "basic commodity," Zj, rather than "human capital." Each x is understood as
a product purchased by households from business firms (equivalent to AK.
above), and t1 ,. .. t. is described as the non-market "time" of the members of the
household-by which Becker presumably means the human capital services of
the household members during intervals of time.
82. See, e.g., id. (2.4a) S = wT + V = I(wtj + pixi).
Equation (2.3a) says that "total income," S, is equal to the average wage rate w
times total units of (market and nonmarket) "time," T, plus non-wage income,
V and that this total income is equal to the sum of the value of household's
non-market "time," plus market goods purchased, pix. As we will see shortly,
Equation (2.4a) cannot be considered a "resource constraint" without addi-
tional assumptions as to how the income is distributed.
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sons.83 This can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpreta-
tion is that Becker's system is logically incomplete, having one
more variable than the number of equations can explain. This
would mean that the system does not have a unique equilibrium.
The second interpretation is that Becker's system is logically
complete, but some of the equations have not been spelled out.
Specifically, it could be interpreted as including all four elements
of the scholastic system, plus the additional assumption that eve-
ryone is always selfish.8 4 Since this very "strong" assumption is
not required by the logic of economic theory, its truth or falsity
can only be established by investigation of the facts. Under
either interpretation, the system has a problem.8 5
The consequences of the absence of the "distribution func-
tion" for the economic theory of fertility are strikingly reflected
in two recent papers.8 6 Both attempt to describe and test the
leading variants of the state-of-the-art economic theory of
fertility.
Xu's paper surveys the theories of the family upon which
current theories of fertility rest and the evidence for these
assumptions. It finds two problems, one in theory and one in
evidence. The problem with the theory is its logical
(in) consistency:
In neo-classical family economics, the household is the
unit of study .... However, it is the welfare of individuals
that should be the fundamental concern. Earlier unitary
household models had to reconcile the single utility frame-
work with the presence of multiple individuals. To do so
unitary household models assume that family members'
utility functions can be systematically aggregated, that indi-
83. See, e.g., id. Equations (1.1) and (2.1) above.
84. See, e.g., id. This would add the special assumption,
(2.7) Dii/Dij = 1, thus converting the general form of the final distribution
function
(2.1) CKi + CL - YiDii/YDj
into a special case,
(2.8) CKi + CL = Yi,
meaning that all income received by anyone is consumed by that person.
85. See, e.g., id. Becker's interacting utility functions for altruists do not
cure this. They imply that all altruists are selfish in the sense that they under-
take such behavior only because they gain pleasure from it. But their main prac-
tical problem is that they assume different people can consume the same scarce
good, which is a contradiction in terms.
86. See generally Michele Boldrin et al., Fertility and Social Security (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11146, 2005); Zeyu Xu, A Survey
on Intra-Household Models and Evidence (May 2004), http://www.columbia.
edu/-zx20/Papers/A%2Survey%20on%2OIntra-Household%2OModels%20
(submitted).pdf.
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vidual budget constraints can be combined, and that
household production can be unified. To make such
aggregations household members are either assumed to
have homogeneous preferences, or have an altruistic
household head that has all the power within the
household.8 7
The paper then surveys alternate theories that see the family
as a place of conflict and bargaining rather than altruism.88 But
a parallel survey of the empirical evidence for all these variants
leads to the following conclusion: "Empirical support for the
existence of altruistic motives is not overwhelming. Indeed,
some of the most influential studies have reached mixed conclu-
sions, possibly favoring 'exchange' rather than altruism as a
motive for intra-family transfers."89
The paper by Boldrin, Mariachristina De Nardi, and Larry E.
Jones argues that the Boldrin-Jones variant favored by its authors
fits the empirical facts about fertility and saving better than the
alternate Becker-Barro model.9 ° But the authors also point out
that all attempts to test either theory depend heavily on assump-
tions made for at least nine intermediate variables; that the
results vary widely with alternate assumptions; and that the varia-
tion in results affects precisely the most important policy ele-
ments: the effects of pay-as-you-go retirement pensions and
national saving on the Total Fertility Rate: "What varies substan-
tially, and sometimes dramatically, with the preference parame-
ters are the levels of both fertility and the capital-output ratio,
and this sensitivity in levels is common to both models."'"
Moreover, the models' accuracies do not inspire confidence
in their use for major policy decisions. For example, the version
preferred by the authors predicted a Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
for the United States of 2.2 in 1950 when the actual TFR was 3.0,
while the best fit for the U.S. TFR in 2000 was 1.82 when the
actual TFR was 2.05-a difference between a significantly declin-
ing and an approximately stable population. 2 In order to "cali-
brate" the model to predict the values actually observed, the
authors found it necessary to use assumptions that they found
questionable because they are contrary to previous research.
87. See Xu, supra note 86, at 2 (citation omitted).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 3.
90. See Boldrin et al., supra note 86.
91. Id. at 32.
92. Id.
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"This seems to point to a lack of richness of the models
overall."93
The Becker-Barro variant assumes, in effect, that every
household is a "dynasty" governed by a single founder who is
altruistic, far-sighted and all-powerful, but that none of his or her
descendants exhibit any of these qualities. 4 The BoldrinJones
variant assumes, in effect, that all parents are essentially selfish
toward their children while all children are essentially altruistic
toward their parents. 95 The numerous models of intra-house-
hold bargaining assume, in effect, that everyone is purely selfish
or even somewhat predatory.96 And the empirical data appear to
support none of these a priori assumptions. 7
Such studies have also tended to confine their focus to coun-
tries representing a relatively small share of the world's popula-
tion and a relatively small share of cultures (Europe and its
cultural offshoots), despite the claim that the "economic
approach to human behavior" is applicable in all cultures.98 In
short, the economic theory of fertility is in some disarray.
Despite their mathematical sophistication, all are handi-
capped by the oversimplification in its basic theory, resulting in
one fewer explanatory variable than variable to be described.
This paradoxically results in economists using highly compli-
cated explanations with many intermediate variables, when a
basic theory that begins by including the missing element can
explain much more, far more simply.
Despite their sharp disagreements, all these competing theo-
ries share one common characteristic: they offer the people they
study no choice about the most fundamental feature of every
economic decision. Fortunately, the problems just recounted are
not peculiar to the specific models but rather are the result of
attempting to explain anything so fundamental as fertility (the
reproduction of human persons) without using the most funda-
mental element of economic theory, which describes one's pref-
erences for persons. 9 Equally fortunate, if we include this
element from the beginning, the result is not only a major simpli-
fication of the theory of fertility, but also a major improvement in
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See equations, supra note 10. Aristotle's and Augustine's "final distri-
bution function," which describes personal love and hate and domestic and
political distributive justice, is described in equations (1.1) and (2.1) above.
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the clarity, applicability, and accuracy of its implications for fiscal
policy.
The simplest and most widely used measure of fertility is the
Total Fertility Rate, which calculates how many children the aver-
age woman would bear in her lifetime if her experience at each
age were the same as the average of women of all ages in that
year.'00 Since it takes exactly one man and one woman to pro-
duce each child, the TFR is also a fairly accurate measure of the
number of births to each adult couple (though of course multi-
ple births, births by different partners, etc., are possible and are
included in the statistic).' 1
Boldrin, De Nardi andJones follow other researchers in rely-
ing heavily on the Infant Mortality Rate as an explanatory varia-
ble for the TFR, mostly because the two have a high statistical
correlation. 10 2 But this is because the two variables are not inde-
pendent. The number of infants who die shortly after birth is
obviously included in the number of infants recently born, which
tends to make the Infant Mortality Rate variable dominate the
results even when mortality is relatively low.' 0 3 One way to adjust
for this problem is to use the Net Reproduction Rate (NRR),
which takes mortality into account, instead of the TFR, which
does not. The NRR is not widely available for most countries but
can be approximated by subtracting the Infant Mortality Rate
from the TFR, resulting in what might be called the net Total
Fertility Rate or net TFR.' °4 The same study also used per capita
GDP, which has a similar problem to the Infant Mortality Rate,
because per capita GDP is highly correlated with longevity: peo-
ple who expect to live long invest more in human and nonhu-
man capital because the returns can be expected for a longer
period; conversely, people with higher incomes tend to afford
better health care and so live longer.'0 5 This problem, too, can
be handled, by dividing any measure of per capita income by a
measure of longevity. In this way, essentially extraneous factors
can be accommodated without clouding the main issues.
There is little disagreement in principle as to why people
have children. The decision boils down to two motives. People
have children because they love them, or because they love them-
selves. To the extent that people have children for the first rea-
son, the decision will not be affected by the availability of other
100. See, e.g., Boldrin et al., supra note 86.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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forms of saving or social insurance, but to the extent that people
have children for the second reason, both private saving and gov-
ernment social insurance will reduce fertility.'1 6 In the latter
case, having children acts as an economic substitute for private
saving or government social insurance, and vice versa. It is con-
ceivable to have a child solely for the benefits received, as if hav-
ing a child was essentially the same as investing in a stock or
bond. (As we found when describing the basic theory above, rais-
ing children who may support one in old age, investing in prop-
erty, and government transfer payments funded by dedicated
taxes can all be expressed in the same way, as a rate of return on
the initial outlay.)
Those were essentially the issues posed by the Becker-Barro
and Boldrin-Jones models just described, but they came to sub-
stantially different conclusions. Both models agreed that the
provision of social insurance reduces fertility, but they reached
sharply different conclusions about the result of forcing people
to save more for their own retirement in the form of claims on
property, or "nonhuman capital." According to the Boldrin-
Jones model, increased private saving will also substantially
reduce fertility, while according to Barro-Becker it will not.10 7
One reason for the inability to reach a clear conclusion is
that both studies used the rate of saving and the payroll tax rate as
shares of total income, when a per capita measure would have
been more appropriate.1 08 We can see this by comparing the net
TFR with per capita government social spending and per capita
national saving for the fifty countries (listed in the appendix),
comprising about two-thirds of the world's population, for which
all variables were available for 2001. Both per capita social
spending and per capita national saving were measured at
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), a technique that adjusts for the
purchasing powers of the currencies in which the original data
are expressed.' 09
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. Gross national income per capita at Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) and national saving per capita are from World Bank 2003. Social spend-
ing per capita at PPP, calculated from the same sources, comes mostly from
OECD 2004.
2006]
610 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
As the charts immediately above and below indicate, per
capita social spending and per capita national saving are both
inversely proportional to the net TFR, and by about the same
proportions.1 10 (The outlier in each chart is Nigeria, perhaps
due to poor data).
110. See id. The adjustments for infant mortality and life expectancy are
valuable but do not significantly affect the statistical relationships.
Per capita National Saving vs. Fertility
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The countries with lower fertility rates lying below the lines
representing those relationships (TFRs close to 1 regardless of
social spending and national saving) consist almost entirely of
countries currently or recently under totalitarian govern-
ments."'I Including a dummy variable for totalitarian govern-
ment is highly statistically significant in all versions of the model,
regardless of the other variables. But it alone is not sufficient to
raise the accuracy of a model beyond the results achieved by Bol-
drin, De Nardi, and Jones.
We have suggested that the failure to account for people's
fundamental preferences for persons is responsible for the ambi-
guity of the findings of the Xu, Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones
results. In the "neo-scholastic" framework we have outlined,
whether we are selfish or unselfish, we allocate our scarce
resources between ourselves and others in proportion to the rela-
tive significance of the persons including ourselves: at the per-
sonal level, in proportion to our personal love for those persons,
in any social community, in accord with that community's "dis-
tributive justice," or formula for allocating the use of its common
goods.1 12
As Augustine's economic analysis pointed out, the two great
commandments-you shall love God above all else and your
neighbor as yourself"'-are not only normatively or prescrip-
tively valid but also positively or descriptively valid, even for those
who disobey them. This is because even those who steal from,
rather than sharing with, others resist having their own goods
stolen and enjoy receiving gifts. Moreover, the two command-
ments are intimately related, because the decision to devote
scarce resources (such as time or money) to another person is
essentially the same, whether the other person is God or another
human being. In both cases, the decision means sacrificing
goods that could otherwise be used for oneself, and thus requires
the same elevation of the other person in one's preferences rela-
tive to oneself.
Thus, the choice to have children because we love them
rather than because of the benefits they confer upon us should
be positively related to the frequency of worship in all cultures.
If Becker is correct that everyone's preferences are identical and
that these preferences are identical in all cultures, we should find
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Deuteronomy 6:5; Leviticus 19:18 (noted in Matthew 22:37-39). As
Augustine carefully explained, "as yourself" cannot always mean "equally with
yourself" when scarce goods are involved. But it does always mean "as a person"
like yourself. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, supra note 5.
2006]
612 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
that the frequency of worship makes no difference. However, we
find that the rates of weekly worship and fertility are positively
related across countries.114 On average, in countries where
weekly worship is close to zero, the TFR is approximately 1.25.
The relationship in all countries suggests that one hundred per-
cent weekly attendance is associated with a net TFR about 2.1
children higher (3.4).115
Weekly Worship vs. Fertility
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Thus the theory of fertility makes a good test case of the two
ways of treating peoples' most fundamental preferences, as well
as of the impact of social spending and national saving on fertil-
ity."' A model including these three factors, with totalitarian
government, explains more than eighty percent of the variation
in the net TFR for the countries surveyed, comprising two-thirds
of the world's population. And the same model explains the
American net TFR exactly: 2.05 predicted and actual in 2001.
Including a detailed breakdown of each country's population by
religious affiliation showed that the Jewish and Protestant popu-
lations are statistically significant (perhaps because weekly com-
munal worship is the norm for religious participation among
114. See World Values Survey, The Values Surveys, 2001, http://www.jd
survey.com:8080/bdasepjds/wvsevs/PrinDocumentation.jsp (last visited Apr.
28, 2006).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., id. The equation was Net TFR (Total Fertility Rate - Infant
Mortality Rate, 2001) = c1 + c2* (rate of weekly worship) + c3*(% Protestant pop-
ulation) + c4 *(% Jewish population) + c5*(totalitarian legacy) + co*log(social
spending per capita at PPP /life expectancy, 2001) + c 7*log(national saving per
capita at PPP/life expectancy, 2001). The results were as follows:
HOW DOES FISCAL POLICY AFECT THE AMERICAN?
Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims but not for Protestants and
Jews around the world), but that the addition of Catholic, Ortho-
dox, Muslim, and Hindu populations is not statistically signifi-
cant and may be omitted. The results by country are listed in the
appendix.
Total Fertility Rate: Predicted vs. Actual
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: How WILL PROJECTED FISCAL
POLICY AFFECT EMPLOYMENT AND FERTILITY IN
COMING DECADES?
Our investigation has shown the basic principles by which
fiscal policy affects employment and fertility. First, by applying
Rueff's Law, we found that unemployment is a function of the
net cost of labor, which is the same as workers' take-home pay
plus government benefits to persons as a share of total national
income-the remainder paid as net compensation to owners of
productive property. We also found that, because government
transfer payments are a substitute for the transfers that otherwise
would take place within the household, particularly between mar-
ried men and married women, increasing government transfer
Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
cl 3.3988 0.3286 10.3443
C2 1.3537 0.2677 5.0555
c3  1.5908 0.4364 3.6455
C4 0.8857 0.1851 4.7840
C5 -0.5851 0.1152 -5.0808
C6 -0.2914 0.0069 -4.2125
C7 -0.2820 0.1067 -2.6422
Adjusted R2 = 0.80847 n = 50.
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payments as a share of national income has lowered the labor
market employment of men but on balance increased the labor
market employment of women. The share of adults employed in
the labor market has increased in the past fifty years because the
share of women employed in the labor market has increased by
more than the share of men has declined. We found that since
social benefits accrue to owners of "human capital," social bene-
fits funded by taxes on property income raise the net cost of
labor and the unemployment rate, while benefits funded with
payroll taxes lower labor market employment and take-home
pay, but without raising the net cost of labor or the unemploy-
ment rate.
Second, we have extended the analysis to investigate the
impact of fiscal policy upon fertility. This required us to fill a
crucial gap in the economic theory of fertility, caused by neglect
of Augustine's insight that every person's most fundamental scale
of preferences is not for economic goods (that is, utility) but for
the persons who are the ends or purposes of the activity (love at
the personal level and distributive justice at all social and politi-
cal levels). Since we distribute our personal or political resources
to other persons in proportion to the significance of those per-
sons to ourselves, and since the same scarce resources cannot be
consumed by oneself and others, the share of resources devoted
to oneself is inversely related to the share devoted to others. This
helped us discover that most variation in the TFR among the fifty
countries for which data are available (comprising about two-
thirds of world population) is explained by just three basic fac-
tors: the TFR is inversely related to per capita social benefits and
per capita national saving, but positively related to frequency of
worship (a signal indicator of resources allocated to other
persons).
This helps us understand the past and the present. But what
does it tell us about the future impact of fiscal policy upon the
American worker? We can suggest the general answer by apply-
ing the same analysis to the course of Federal fiscal policy pro-
jected over the next seventy-five years under current law. As is
well known, total Federal spending as a share of the economy is
expected to increase by about one-half, entirely the result of
three basic programs: Social Security retirement and disability
benefits, Medicare health benefits for persons over age sixty-five,
and Medicaid for the indigent. At the same time, total Federal
revenues are expected to remain close to their average since
about 1960, of about twenty percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). As a result, interest payments are expected to add more
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than ten percentage points, with total Federal spending reaching
about forty percent of GDP by 2075.
Actual & Projected Federal Spending
% of GDP, 1950-2075
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What effects are these developments likely to have for the
fertility and employment of the American worker? There are
three basic implications.
First, by applying our model of fertility, we can anticipate
that under those circumstances, the American TFR would be
likely to decline from 2.05, which is close to the replacement rate
of 2.11, to about 1.87 by 2025, 1.73 by 2050, and 1.60 by 2075
(see column (2) in the table below). That would fall between the
Social Security Administration's Trustees' Intermediate and
High-Cost Assumptions from 2025 through 2050, and be worse
than the High Cost Assumptions thereafter. Without immigra-
tion, the U.S. population would shrink, but the decline in fertility
could be expected to increase the inflow of immigrants (though
also the resistance by anti-immigrant political factions). Despite
this, if legal abortion were ended, the TFR would be likely to rise
immediately and remain above the replacement rate at least
through 2075 (see column (3) in table below). 17
117. SeeJohn D. Mueller, The Socioeconomic Costs of Roe v. Wade, FAMILY
POLICY, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 3, available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/200503
28_Mueller3.pdf.
2006]
616 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Actual TFR and Actual and Actual and Memo: SSA
model with projected TFR projected TFR, Trustees TFR,
projected with projected same as (2) Inter-mediate
benefit share at benefit share at without legal Assumptions
2001 incomes projected abortion
Year incomes
2001 actual 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
2025 est. 1.98 1.87 2.51 1.95
2050 est. 1.92 1.73 2.35 1.95
2075 est. 1.87 1.60 2.22 1.95
Second, the relationships we have found between transfer
payments and labor market employment suggest that the labor
market employment of men would continue to decline, from
69.2% in 2004 to about 58% by 2075. But the labor market
employment of women would likely increase from 56% in 2004,
exceed the men's rate, and reach about 63% by 2030 before lev-
eling off.
U.S. Transfer Payments vs. Labor Market Employment
Transfer payments actual and projected
0%0 10% ale rket em Ioy ent, % of adult population>70/
20% 50%
40%
30% 30%
1950 196 1970 1080 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2090
Third, under current law (as interpreted by CBO), the net
labor cost in the American economy is likely to decline until
2015, but then rise steadily through 2075. The rise in the net
labor cost is due to the projected increases in transfer payments
as a share of the economy, which under current law are expected
to be funded by borrowing. This suggests that the unemploy-
ment rate would rise over time from 4% in 2000 and 5.5% in
2004 to about 6% in 2025, 9% in 2050, and about 11% in 2075.
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O)O~~c4 T0000T 0 00000
Transfer Men Women Unemployment
payments, share employed employed Net labor rate, actual &
of national in labor in labor cost, projected with
Year income market market current law current law
2000 actual 8.8% 71.9% 57.5% 62.6% 4.0%
2004 actual 9.8% 69.2% 56.0% 64.9% 5.5%
2025 projected 12.8% 63.5% 63.1% 64.6% 6.2%
2050 projected 14.4% 60.2% 64.3% 66.5% 8.9%
2075 projected 16.1% 57.4% 63.5% 68.4% 11.2%
The analysis leads to two important conclusions. First, if
social benefits increase as a share of national income as projected
under current policy, and are funded either by borrowing or by
the income tax, the unemployment rate will rise as it has in
Europe, and as a result U.S. national income will fall further
below its productive capacity. Second, both allowing social bene-
fits to mushroom as a share of the economy (as Democrats pro-
pose) and forcing workers to save more by shifting the tax
burden from income to payroll taxes (as Republicans propose)
would tip fertility below the current replacement rate of about
2.1 children per couple, to as low as 1.6 by 2075. Therefore, to
avoid an increase in unemployment and a fall in population,
social benefits must not increase significantly as a share of
national income and must continue to be financed by taxes on
labor income, while general government is funded by an income
tax that falls equally on labor and property income.
Projected Shares of National Income
25% 1
<Net labor cost (take-home pay + net transfers to persons)
20061
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NET TOTAL FERTILITY RATE: PREDICTED V. ACTUAL, 2001
Region Country Net TFR predicted Actual net TFR, 2001
America: North United States 2.05 2.05
Canada 1.74 1.60
Mexico 2.42 2.60
America: South Argentina 2.10 2.42
Brazil 2.33 2.06
Chile 2.18 2.15
Peru 2.80 2.93
Uruguay 2.26 2.35
Venezuela 2.77 2.44
Europe: Northern Denmark 1.64 1.73
Estonia 1.45 1.20
Finland 1.68 1.70
Iceland 1.76 2.01
Ireland 2.07 1.89
Latvia 1.55 1.13
Lithuania 1.35 1.36
Norway 1.56 1.81
Sweden 1.75 1.53
United Kingdom 2.12 1.72
Europe: Western Austria 1.31 1.39
Belgium 1.47 1.61
France 1.26 1.75
Germany 1.40 1.38
Netherlands 1.60 1.65
Switzerland 1.33 1.47
Europe: Eastern Belarus 1.10 1.26
Bulgaria 1.43 1.12
Czech Republic 0.87 1.18
Hungary 1.24 1.24
Poland 1.65 1.36
Romania 1.65 1.33
Russian Federation 1.07 1.25
Ukraine 1.34 1.27
Europe: Southern Croatia 1.17 1.93
Slovak Republic 1.49 1.24
Greece 1.43 1.33
Italy 1.57 1.18
Portugal 1.85 1.48
Slovenia 0.87 1.28
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Spain 1.46 1.15
Africa Nigeria 4.34 5.46
South Africa 2.34 2.37
Asia/Oceania Australia 1.63 1.76
China PR 1.76 1.79
India 3.17 2.97
Israel 2.57 2.56
Japan 1.01 1.41
Korea (South) 1.85 1.72
Phillippines 3.68 3.39
Turkey 2.50 2.08

